

Understanding Cryptography: From Caesar to RSA

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
Outline

- 1 Basic Substitution & Attacks
- 2 More Complex Methods
- 3 Something Completely Different?
- 4 Two Modern Algorithms

Caesar

*if there was occasion for
secrecy, he wrote in cyphers;
that is, he used the alphabet
in such a manner, that not a
single word could be made
out. The way to **decipher**
those epistles was to
substitute the fourth for the
first letter, as **d** for **a**, and so
for the other letters
respectively*

„The Lives of the Twelve Caesars”
Gaius Suetonius



Caesar

The resulting pair of plain and cipher alphabet is:

plain: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTU VWXYZ
cipher: XYZABCDEFGHIJKLMN OPQRSTU VW

Example

We try this simple message here

plaintext: WETRY THISS IMPL E MESSA GEHER E
ciphertext: TBQOV QEFPP FJMIB JBPPX DBEBO B

Caesar - Remarks

Key

- shift defines cipher completely (e.g. 3 letters).
- key space very small (brute force by hand)

Rot13

- encryption identical to decryption ($A \xrightarrow{13} N \xrightarrow{13} A$)
- e.g to prevent spoilers


5

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Caesar - Attack

Letter Frequency

TBQOV QEFPP FJMIB JBPPX DBEBO B



6


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Caesar - Attack

Plain text

- we know/guess that the cipher text contains message
- there is only one possible position

TBQOV QEFPP FJMIB JBPPX DBEBO B
MESSA GE



Mnbrvcnp
Treasure

7

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Randomised Substitution

- use permutations
- big key-space (26!)
- could use symbols

AJ	BK	CL
DM	EN	FO
GP	HQ	IR

VO>F<>NΓVV ΓΓΓΓΓ
ΞΟVVJ ΓΟΓΟΓ Γ

SW
TX UY
VZ


8

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Randomised Substitution - Attack

Attacks

- plain text attack
- frequency analysis for letters: ETAON
- frequency analysis for larger groups
- use partially decrypted words



„The Gold-Bug“
E.A.Poe

9

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Multiple Cipher Equivalents

Goal: flatten the letter distributions

- define multiple options for the cipher alphabet
- need symbols or numbers to extend this idea further

plain: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
cipher: BEINTACWYYQMJPKOGSLXRZDHVU
F

10

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Multiple Cipher Equivalents - Attack

GMAZD VACKC ARHPG IYTWZ RYKHY OTDEK GWDCS
EATJU HEOKA MAHAI GETGR YKSEH ADRKZ AHYCU
JXAKH YAKJU HKYGV DTHYU TCGZM DCKYE MYAWA
HAKAC RYHYR ZAKPG ARHDT GCKJU HKPDW UHAYB
GMDTA ARWAM AWUEZ KYUCG PACUH XYCKD BBYTH
CKYTG XYMDG MAZBT YXPAX CDZBE RWBTY XECZE
TFGEO ATOZD ECPGO ERARB ZUDRO GERWH PDXYT
GPDGV DTOAC GCPAX CDZBA RKPAC WUHAK PGXYT
DIACG ZAPDW ATGOH CPACD BBYTK CERWH PGXYT
DCUOO GCCBU ZKPDG GDBBY THCET GKPDY YTGPD
IAZZS TYJEJ ZAAXS TYMGE RWDVE ZHPAC YIRXA
RWERW KPGXY TDOYX SZGHD ZAWYG CPDES SGETK
YBUZB AZHPD IAZZY BPACO TGEKY T

11

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Summary of the Basics

Ideas

- 1 shift alphabet
- 2 randomise alphabet
- 3 use multiple cipher equivalents

Attack Methods

- brute force
- plaintext
- frequencies (letters, pairs, trigrams)
- repeated segments

12

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Vigenere Cipher - Algorithm

Idea use more than one full cipher alphabet.

plain: ABCDEFGHIJKLMN**P**QRSTUVWXYZ
 cipher C: **C**DEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ**A**B
 cipher E: **E**FGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCD
 cipher R: **R**STUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMN**P**Q
 cipher N: **N**OPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHI**E**FGHIJKLM

plaintext: **WETRY** THISS IMPL E MESSA GEHER E
 key: CERN CERN CERN CERN CERN CERN CERN
 ciphertext: **YIKEA** XYVUW ZZRPV ZGWJN IYRT I

13

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Vigenere Cipher - Attack

- 1 **determine key-length n**
- 2 split into n columns
- 3 use letter frequency for each column separately

Coincidence Counting

ciphertext: YIKEA XYVUW ZZRPV **Z**GWJN IYRT **I**
 shift 2: YIK EAXYV UWZZR PVZGW JNIIY RT **I**
 shift 4: Y IKEAX YVUWZ **Z**RPVZ GWJN IYRT **I**

key-length: 4

14

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CSC 2010: HTML riddle

Code

- 1 Take password and create hash
- 2 check hash against given value
- 3 if check passed, decipher secret message by XOR with password letters

Enter password:

Go!

This webpage was protected by
HTMLProtector

15

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CSC 2010: HTML riddle - Key Length

0x68 0x56 0x42 0x18 0x50 0x4B 0x52 **0x18** 0x47
 0x68 0x56 0x42 **0x18** 0x50

0x5C 0x45 0x41 0x11 0x5A 0x42 0x4A 0x58 0x56
 0x4B 0x52 0x18 0x47 0x5C 0x45 0x41 0x11 0x5A

0x42 0x4B 0x11 0x49 0x52 0x4A 0x42 0x56 0x59
0x42 0x4A 0x58 0x56 0x42 0x4B 0x11 0x49 0x52

0x19 0x11 0x76 0x7C 0x16 **0x11** 0x70 0x17 0x54
 0x4A 0x42 0x56 0x59 0x19 **0x11** 0x76 0x7C 0x16

0x58 0x4F 0x52 0x18
 0x11 0x70 0x17 0x54 0x58 0x4F 0x52 0x18

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CSC 2010: HTML riddle - Columns

```

0x68 0x56 0x42 0x18 0x50 0x4B 0x52 0x18
0x47 0x5C 0x45 0x41 0x11 0x5A 0x42 0x4A
0x58 0x56 0x42 0x4B 0x11 0x49 0x52 0x4A
0x42 0x56 0x59 0x19 0x11 0x76 0x7C 0x16
0x11 0x70 0x17 0x54 0x58 0x4F 0x52 0x18
0x58 0x57 0x17 0x5B 0x58 0x4D 0x4E 0x18
0x7A 0x78 0x7A 0x7D 0x7F 0x6A 0x7C 0x15
0x64 0x6B 0x76 0x74 0x62 0x72 0x7E 0x61
0x1D 0x19 0x62 0x4A 0x50 0x55 0x17 0x4A
0x54 0x5E 0x5E 0x57 0x5F 0x17 0x17 0x71
0x11 0x58 0x5A 0x18 0x03 0x0C 0x17 0x41
0x54 0x58 0x45 0x4B 0x11 0x56 0x5B 0x5C
0x1F 0x19 0x7A 0x41 0x11 0x5F 0x56 0x4E
0x5E 0x4B 0x5E 0x4C 0x54 0x19 0x43 0x50

```

17

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CSC 2010: HTML riddle - Key Letter

```

0x11 = 0001 0001
0x20 = 0010 0000
0011 0001 = 0x31 = '1'


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<http://www.physik.uzh.ch/~nchiapol/icsc>

18

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Extending Vigenere: Wheel Cipher



- 36 disks
- key: disk ordering
- assemble plaintext in one line
- read off ciphertext in any other line

19

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Extending Vigenere: Plaintext Auto-Key

```

plaintext: WETRY THISS IMPL E MESSA GEHER E
key:       CERNW ETRYT HISSI MPLEM ESSAG E
ciphertext: YIKEU XAZQL PUHDM YTDWM KWZEX I

```

Weakness

- The key has the properties of plaintext.
- Strings in key and plaintext at fixed offset.

20

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Extending Vigenere: Key Auto-Key

- simple rule (sum of last 3 key letters)
- hard to do manually
- simple rules are probably weak
- mechanical devices
- pseudo random number generator

```
plaintext: WETRY THISS IMPL MESSA GEHER E
key:      24734 41944 75689 30257 46770 4
ciphertext: YIAUC XIRWW PRVTN PEUXH KKOLR I
```

21

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Extending Vigenere: The Enigma

The Enigma

- randomised alphabets
- generates different alphabet for each letter
- sequence defined by rotors configuration
- huge periods:

$$26^{n_{\text{Rotors}}}$$



22

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A provably secure cipher

The One-Time Pad

- generate truly random key with same length as message
- use key only once



23

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Block Ciphers

- ciphers worked on one letter at a time
- could use groups instead

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Playfair

Playfair

- encrypt pairs of letters at a time
- pair in row: next to right
- pair in column: next below
- else: take diagonally opposed

C	E	R	N	A
B	D	F	G	H
I	K	L	M	O
P	Q	S	T	U
V	W	X	Y	Z

Example

plaintext: **WETRY** THISS IMPLE MESSA GEHER E
 ciphertext: EDSNN YBOXX KOSIN KRQUR DNDAN R

25

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Playfair - Attack

- needs a lot of cipher text
- use statistics of letter pairs
- hope for plaintext segments
- algorithm has typical properties
e.g. ER → RN

C	E	R	N	A
B	D	F	G	H
I	K	L	M	O
P	Q	S	T	U
V	W	X	Y	Z

26

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Summary Complex Methods

Ideas

- 1 use multiple alphabets
- 2 generate the key during encryption
- 3 encrypt groups of letters

Attack Methods

- coincidence counting
- reuse of key
- knowing the rules


27

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Codes

Instead of letters or groups of letters we could replace whole words.

- limited possibilities
- need large code books
- useful for compression



28

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Steganography

- mark letters with pinhole
- invisible ink
- microdots
- selected bits in image file

29

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Transposition Methods

Example

plaintext: WE TRY THIS **SIMPLE** MESSAGE HERE

W	E	T	R	Y
T	H	I	S	S
I	M	P	L	E
M	E	S	S	A
G	E	H	E	R
E	T	A	O	N

ciphertext: WT**IM**G EEH**ME** ETT**IP** SHARS **L**SEYOY **S**EARN

30

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Data Encryption Standard

- Block Cipher
- Blocks of 64 Bits
- Key: 64 Bits (56 used)

Generating Key Stream


- use plaintext & key
- XOR
- Permutations
- Substitution

31

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Data Encryption Standard

- 1 split block in halves
- 2 prepare subkey
- 3 **combine subkey and right half**
- 4 xor result and left half
- 5 switch halves
- 6 restart at 2 (16x)



32

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Data Encryption Standard

Result

Each bit in each block depends on every other bit of the block and all the key bits.

- no statistical properties remain
- prevents differential cryptanalysis (injecting plaintexts with minimal differences)

33

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Public Key

The Basic Idea

use different keys for encryption and decryption

- need a problem that is hard to solve
- but easy with additional information

Example

Factorise: $7031 = 79 \cdot 89$

34

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Public Key - RSA

Step by Step: Generate Key

- 1 choose two prime numbers p, q
- 2 calculate $n = p \cdot q$
- 3 calculate $f = (p - 1) \cdot (q - 1)$
- 4 find two numbers e, d such that $e \cdot d = 1 \mod f$
- 5 publish e and n , keep d secret

$$p = 11, q = 7$$

$$n = 77$$

$$f = 60$$

$$e = 23$$

$$d = x \cdot \frac{f}{e} + \frac{1}{e} \quad x \in \mathbb{N}$$

$$\Rightarrow d = 47 \quad (x = 18)$$

35

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Public Key - RSA

Step by Step: Usage

- 1 encrypt:
 $c = m^e \mod n$

$$m = 42 \quad (< n)$$

$$c = 42^{23} \mod 77 = 14$$

- 2 decrypt:
 $m = c^d \mod n$

$$m = 14^{47} \mod 77 = 42$$

36

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Public Key - RSA

$$m^{e \cdot d} = m \mod (p \cdot q)$$
$$e \cdot d = 1 \mod (p-1)(q-1)$$

$$a \cdot b \mod n = (a \mod n) \cdot (b \mod n) \mod n$$

$$m^{a+b} \mod n = ((m^a \mod n) \cdot m^b) \mod n$$

$$m^{a \cdot b} \mod n = (m^a \mod n)^b \mod n$$

37

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Side Channel Attacks

The attacker decides what he attacks:

Timing Computations need different amount of time

Power Computations consume different amount of power

Fault Computations can be forced to fail

38

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Thank you for your attention.

39

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41

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